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Over the last 15 years the New Keynesian framework has become predominant in the
world of applied monetary policy analysis. This framework is commonly characterized by
linear models with nominal rigidities and strong forward-looking elements, and which can
be rationalized as approximations to micro-founded dynamic equilibrium models. The
most common source of nominal rigidity in this framework is the Calvo (1983) pricing
model as described by Yun (1996).
The fact that some prices are predetermined in these models leads to a version of
Kydland and Prescott's (1977) time-inconsistency problem for monetary policy. There
is a vast literature studying aspects of discretionary, i.e. time-consistent, policy in New
Keynesian models with Calvo pricing. But the typical practice in the New Keynesian
literature, exempli¯ed by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) and Woodford (2003), has
been to work with linear models approximated around a zero-in°ation steady state. The
present paper studies discretionary optimal monetary policy in the underlying non-linear
model.1
The paper has two main results. First, the steady-state in°ation rate can take a
wide range of magnitudes for reasonable values of the structural parameters. Under a
baseline calibration, discretionary equilibrium involves a steady-state in°ation rate of
greater than eight percent. The steady-state in°ation rate depends non-monotonically
on the Calvo parameter. For low degrees of price rigidity, a small increase in rigidity is
associated with higher in°ation. But for high degrees of price rigidity, a small further
increase in rigidity implies a lower steady-state in°ation rate under discretionary policy.
There is a positive relationship between the desired markup and the steady-state in°ation
rate, and between the labor supply elasticity and the steady-state in°ation rate.
1In Yun's (1996) version of the Calvo model there is price indexation, whereas the version in King
and Wolman (1996) has no indexation. We analyze the Calvo model without indexation.
2To give a sense of the magnitudes, the steady-state in°ation rate varies between
essentially zero for extremely high price stickiness with a desired markup of 1:11, to
greater than 40 percent with a price non-adjustment probability of 0:67, a desired markup
of 1:33 and an in¯nite labor supply elasticity. Under commitment, the long-run in°ation
rate is zero for all values of these parameters. Thus, the wide range of in°ation rates
under discretion makes it di±cult to infer the degree of commitment from observed
in°ation rates. For instance, the model can predict a high steady-state in°ation rate,
which would suggest that actual monetary policymakers have access to a commitment
technology. Or it can predict a low in°ation rate in discretionary equilibrium, e.g. as
the result of inelastic labor supply, leaving little di®erence between the in°ation rates
under commitment and discretion. Nonetheless, the results suggest that the commonly
applied zero-in°ation approximation is inappropriate in the absence of a ¯scal scheme to
eliminate the monopoly distortion.
Out of steady state, the presence of an endogenous state variable leads to a grad-
ual transition of in°ation. Speci¯cally, if the initial condition involves in°ation higher
than steady state, discretionary policy generates an immediate drop in in°ation followed
by a gradual increase to the steady state. In contrast, if the Calvo model is approxi-
mated around the zero-in°ation steady state there is no state variable, so in°ation jumps
immediately to zero.
Our second main result relates to an existing literature which has identi¯ed discre-
tionary policy as a source of multiple equilibria.2 Under discretionary policy, private
agents make decisions such as how much to save or what prices to set, based on their
expectations of future policy. Those decisions become embodied in state variables such
as the capital stock or prices, and in future periods a discretionary policymaker responds
to those state variables. Thus, there is the potential for a form of complementarity
2Here and throughout the paper, we restrict attention to Markov-perfect equilibria.
3between future policy and expected future policy. Viewed from another angle, the fact
that policy will react to endogenous state variables can be a source of complementarity
among private agents' actions. Examples of such complementarity leading to multiple
equilibria can be found in Glomm and Ravikumar's (1995) model of public and private
education, and in the modi¯cation of Kydland and Prescott's (1977) °ood control ex-
ample as described by King (2006). The link between discretionary policy and multiple
equilibria has been especially prominent in the monetary policy literature, among work
that has studied discretionary equilibrium in full-blown nonlinear sticky-price models.
Albanesi, Chari and Christiano (2003) show that multiple equilibria arise under discre-
tionary policy in a model in which a fraction of ¯rms have predetermined prices. Khan,
King and Wolman (2001) and King and Wolman (2004) show that in Taylor-style models
with prices set for three and two periods respectively, multiple equilibria arise under dis-
cretion.3 The ¯nding of multiple equilibria in these previous studies raises the question
of whether lack of commitment leads to multiple equilibria in the Calvo model as well.
We ¯nd that discretionary policy does not induce su±ciently strong complementar-
ity to generate equilibrium multiplicity in the Calvo model. This is surprising given the
basic similarity between the Calvo and Taylor models. In both models there is staggered
pricing, and the policy problem of choosing the money supply to maximize welfare in-
volves a static trade-o® between the markup and a relative price distortion. What di®ers
across the two models is the dynamic aspect of the policy problem.
In the Taylor model with two-period pricing (as studied by King and Wolman (2004)),
the only intertemporal link is the nominal price set by the half of ¯rms that adjust in the
3Siu (2008) extends King and Wolman's (2004) analysis by incorporating elements of state-dependent
pricing and shows that Markov-perfect discretionary equilibrium is unique. Those papers assume that
monetary policy is conducted with a money supply instrument. In contrast, Dotsey and Hornstein (2009)
show that with an interest rate instrument there is a unique Markov-perfect discretionary equilibrium
in a Taylor model with two-period pricing.
4current period. The policymaker in the subsequent period chooses to adjust the money
supply proportionally with that predetermined price, and thus the price does not a®ect
the set of feasible outcomes for future policymakers. However, the expectation of this
future policy response leads to complementarity in ¯rms' price-setting decisions, and to
multiple equilibria.
In the Calvo model, in addition to the single nominal price set by ¯rms in the cur-
rent period, the policymaker in the subsequent period inherits an entire distribution of
predetermined prices. The distribution can be summarized by a statistic we will call the
inherited relative price distortion. The future policymaker chooses to adjust the money
supply less than proportionally with the price set by ¯rms in the present period, for two
reasons. First, ¯rms that choose a high price have a small expenditure share in aggregate
consumption, so their price has a small e®ect on the overall price level. Indeed, we show
that if the money supply is set in proportion to the previous period's price level, and thus
as a concave function of the previous period's optimal price, there is a unique private-
sector equilibrium. Second, the future policymaker's policy problem is in°uenced by the
inherited relative price distortion, which increases if adjusting ¯rms in the present set a
higher price. The larger that distortion, the less the future money supply accommodates
increases in the current price level. Thus, as a result of the presence of many cohorts
of predetermined prices, the high degree of complementarity necessary for generating
multiple equilibria is broken.
Our paper is closely related to Anderson, Kim and Yun (2010). They study opti-
mal allocations without commitment in the Calvo model.4 In contrast, our framework
4Yun (2005) and Adam and Billi (2007) also study optimal allocations in non-linear versions of the
Calvo model. Yun includes a ¯scal instrument for o®setting the markup distortion, which eliminates
the time-inconsistency problem, and implies that in the steady state in°ation is zero. The transition
dynamics in Yun's model are a®ected by the state variable as they are in our analysis. Adam and Billi
take into account the non-linearity arising from the zero bound on nominal interest rates in an otherwise
5involves a discretionary policymaker choosing the money supply. The former approach
cannot be used to investigate the possibility of multiple private-sector equilibria for a
given policy action. Anderson, Kim and Yun's solution method, like ours, is based on
Chebyshev collocation. While they study a slightly di®erent region of the parameter
space, the nature of their solutions is consistent with our ¯ndings. Unlike the two-period
Taylor model, where the choice of whether to study a planner's problem or a policy prob-
lem can mean the di®erence between uniqueness and multiplicity, in the Calvo model
this choice yields identical results for the examples we have studied.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section relates our analysis to the early
literature on discretionary monetary policy. Section 3 contains a description of the Calvo
model. Section 4 de¯nes a discretionary equilibrium in the model. Section 5 presents
our numerical results, emphasizing the issue of multiplicity or lack thereof. Section 6
contains a sensitivity analysis. Section 7 concludes.
2 Relation to early literature
Although the literature on time-consistency problems for monetary policy is vast, it is
comprised of two seemingly disparate branches. Much of the literature { and most of
the profession's intuition { is derived from the seminal work by Kydland and Prescott
(1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983). They studied reduced-form macroeconomic models
in which the frictions giving leverage to monetary policy were not precisely spelled out.
In contrast, the sticky-price models popularized in the last 15 years are precise about
those frictions. While there has been a great deal of work on discretionary policy in
sticky-price models, the connection between that work and the seminal papers remains
poorly understood. In this section we explain how our analysis of discretionary monetary
policy in the Calvo model relates to Barro and Gordon (1983) (hereafter, BG), which
linear New Keynesian model.
6elaborated on Kydland and Prescott's (1977) framework.
In BG, under discretion the central bank takes expectations of in°ation as given when
choosing a policy action that directly determines actual in°ation. Under commitment the
policymaker would take into account the endogeneity of expectations in all but an initial
period. Because surprise in°ation can raise output, and because of distortions that
make output ine±ciently low, discretion leads to an equilibrium in°ation rate that is
higher than would be optimal with commitment. Modern staggered pricing models such
as the Calvo model also give rise to a time-consistency problem: monopoly distortions
make output ine±ciently low { as in BG { and with some prices predetermined, surprise
in°ation can raise output { as in BG. However, an important di®erence between BG
and analysis of discretionary monetary policy in staggered pricing models arises from
the fact that staggered pricing models explicitly incorporate intertemporal choices by
private agents.
At the heart of time-consistency problems for monetary policy is the notion that a
discretionary policymaker takes as given private agents' expectations, but in equilibrium
those expectations accurately incorporate the policymaker's optimal behavior. In BG,
although the model contains multiple periods, the expectations just referred to are cur-
rent expectations about current policy. The only dynamics in BG occur through serial
correlation in exogenous shocks. Without other intertemporal links, the policy problem
is a static one in BG: treating expectations as ¯xed, higher in°ation is costly in its own
right but brings about a bene¯cial reduction in unemployment. In equilibrium, private
expectations are validated, and the policymaker balances the static marginal cost and
marginal bene¯t of additional in°ation.
Staggered pricing models are inherently dynamic: because prices may stay in e®ect
for multiple periods, the optimality condition for price setting incorporates expectations
of future conditions. Prices set in the past thus incorporate expectations of current
7policy actions. In the current period, a discretionary policymaker chooses her action
taking as given those expectations, which are embedded in the predetermined prices.
Looking forward, the policymaker knows that her actions will \directly" a®ect prices
set in the current period. Those prices in turn a®ect the state of the economy in the
future, introducing an explicit intertemporal element into the policy problem. Whereas
in BG equilibrium requires that current policy actions be consistent with current period
expectations, in staggered pricing models equilibrium requires that current policy actions
be consistent with expectations formed in the past.
The intertemporal nature of price setting also means that staggered pricing models
generally contain one or more state variables that can be a®ected by a policymaker, even
under discretion. While today's policymaker takes as given past prices, today's policy
action a®ects current prices, which in turn a®ect the distribution of prices inherited by
the policymaker next period. The distribution of predetermined prices a®ects the feasible
outcomes for next period's policymaker. Thus, the discretionary policymaker does not
face a purely static tradeo® between in°ation and real activity; that tradeo® is present,
but it is complicated by the fact that the current policy action a®ects tomorrow's state,
and thus tomorrow's value function. Regarding this intertemporal element of the policy
problem, one of the main points of this paper is that di®erent staggered pricing models
have di®erent implications for equilibrium under discretionary monetary policy.
The static output-in°ation tradeo® present in staggered pricing models is similar
to the one in BG, as mentioned above. However, because the Calvo model and other
staggered pricing models are optimizing models, one can be explicit about the source
of that tradeo®. Monopolistic competition makes output ine±ciently low. How can
in°ation increase output? With some prices predetermined, a one-time surprise increase
in the money supply that creates in°ation does not fall evenly on all ¯rms. If money
demand is interest inelastic, ¯rms that can adjust their price will not do so aggressively,
8and there will be an overall reduction in the markup and an increase in output. Loosely
speaking, the larger is the money surprise, the higher is the in°ation and the larger is
the bene¯cial e®ect on the markup and output. Because the in°ation is generated by
only a fraction of the ¯rms however, higher in°ation is associated with larger dispersion
of relative prices. Such dispersion leads to ine±cient allocation of spending across goods
because, in the absence of heterogeneity among ¯rms, it is e±cient for all ¯rms to produce
the same quantities. In staggered pricing models then, the policy tradeo® involves the
ability of surprise in°ation to reduce the markup against the cost of surprise in°ation in
distorting relative prices.
3 The Calvo model
This section describes the dynamic general equilibrium model with Calvo pricing. It is
characterized by a representative household that values consumption and dislikes sup-
plying labor, a constant-velocity money demand equation, a competitive labor market,
a continuum of monopolistically competitive ¯rms producing goods for which house-
holds have constant elasticity of substitution preferences, and a monetary authority that
chooses the money supply. Each ¯rm faces a constant probability of price adjustment.
We assume that the model's exogenous variables are constant; thus, there is no uncer-
tainty about fundamentals. The money supply is an endogenous variable.
3.1 Households
There is a large number of identical, in¯nitely-lived households. They act as price-takers
in labor and product markets, and they own shares in the economy's monopolistically
competitive goods-producing ¯rms. Households' preferences over consumption (ct) and
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The consumer's °ow budget constraint is
Ptwtnt + Rt¡1Bt¡1 +
Z 1
0
dt (z)dz ¸ Ptct + Bt;
where wt is the real wage, Rt is the one-period gross nominal interest rate, Bt is the
quantity of one-period nominal bonds purchased in period t, dt (z) is the dividend paid
by ¯rm z, and Pt is the nominal price of a unit of consumption. The aggregator (1)
















From the consumer's intratemporal problem, we have the e±ciency condition
Âctn
¹
t = wt; (4)









where ¼t ´ Pt=Pt¡1 denotes the gross in°ation rate between periods t ¡ 1 and t. We
assume that households hold money equal to the quantity of nominal consumption:
Mt = Ptct: (5)






We will refer to mt as the normalized money supply.
3.2 Firms
Each ¯rm z 2 [0;1] produces output yt (z) using a technology that is linear in labor
nt (z), the only input, with a constant level of productivity that is normalized to unity:
yt (z) = nt (z):












When a ¯rm adjusts its price, it maximizes the present discounted value of pro¯ts, which
we denote Vt. Because each ¯rm adjusts its price with constant probability 1 ¡® in any










where Qt;t+j is the j-period ahead discount factor for nominal cash °ows. With house-


















k=1 Rt¡1+k = 1. The factor ®j is the probability that a price set in period t will
remain in e®ect in period t + j. Note that Vt is the present value of pro¯ts associated
with charging the price Xt. When the ¯rm has an opportunity to adjust after period
t, it will reoptimize, and thus those states are not relevant for determining the optimal
11price in period t. The optimal price is determined by di®erentiating (7) with respect to
Xt. We will denote the pro¯t-maximizing value of Xt by P0;t and we will denote by p0;t
the nominal price P0;t normalized by the previous period's price level, which serves as an























The real wage is equal to real marginal cost here because ¯rm-level productivity is
assumed constant and equal to one. With the constant elasticity aggregator (1) a ¯rm's
optimal markup of price over marginal cost is constant and equal to "=(" ¡ 1). Because
the ¯rm cannot adjust its price each period, if the real wage or the in°ation rate are
not constant then the ¯rm's markup will vary over time. The optimal pricing equation
(8) indicates that the ¯rm chooses a constant markup over an appropriately de¯ned
weighted average of current and future marginal costs. Note that the economy-wide
average markup is simply the inverse of the real wage.
The optimal pricing condition can be written recursively by de¯ning two new vari-
ables, Nt and Dt, that are related to the numerator and denominator of (8), respectively:
Nt = ¼
"
t (wt + ®¯Nt+1); (9)
Dt = ¼
"¡1









































Goods market clearing requires that the consumption demand for each individual good
is equal to the output of that good:
ct (z) = yt (z); (14)
and labor market clearing requires that the labor input into the production of all goods
equal the supply of labor by households:
Z 1
0
nt(z)dz = nt: (15)






where nj;t is the labor input employed in period t by a ¯rm that set its price in period
t¡j. Combining this expression with the goods market clearing condition (14), then using














which can be written recursively as
nt
ct















13This equation contains two predetermined variables, but it is only their ratio that mat-





and this inherited relative price distortion will serve as the single state variable.5 The
labor market clearing condition (18) can now be written as














We are interested in studying Markov-perfect equilibria (MPE) with discretionary
monetary policy. In an MPE, outcomes depend only on payo®-relevant state variables;
trigger strategies and any role for reputation are ruled out. Hence, it is important to
establish what the relevant state variables are. Although there are an in¯nite number
of predetermined nominal prices (P0;t¡j; j = 1;2;:::), for the MPE a state variable is
relevant only if it a®ects the monetary authority's set of feasible real outcomes. It
follows that in an MPE the normalized money supply will be a function of the single
state variable ¢t¡1. Henceforth, when we refer to a \discretionary equilibrium" it should
be understood that the equilibrium is Markov perfect.
3.4 Monetary authority and timing
The monetary authority chooses the money supply, Mt. In a discretionary equilibrium
the money supply will be chosen each period to maximize present-value welfare. We
assume the sequence of actions within a period is as follows:
1. Predetermined prices (P0;t¡j, j > 0) are known at the beginning of the period.
2. The monetary authority chooses the money supply.
5We call ¢t¡1 the inherited relative price dispersion because from (17) it summarizes the dispersion
in predetermined relative prices.
143. Firms that adjust in the current period set their prices, and simultaneously all
other period-t variables are determined.
Timing assumptions are important in models with staggered price-setting. Transpos-
ing items 2 and 3 or assuming that ¯rms and the monetary authority act simultaneously
would change the nature of the policy problem and the properties of equilbrium.
4 Discretionary equilibrium in the Calvo model
In a discretionary MPE the policymaker chooses the money supply as a function of the
state, taking as given the behavior of future policymakers. The policymaker also takes
into account that ¯rms adjusting in the current period will behave optimally in response
to the policy action, as implied by our timing assumption. In addition, the policymaker
takes into account all the other relevant private-sector equilibrium conditions. In equi-
librium, the future policy that is taken as given is also the policy chosen by the current
policymaker.
4.1 Equilibrium for arbitrary monetary policy
As a preliminary to studying discretionary equilibrium, it is useful to consider stationary
equilibria for arbitrary monetary policy { that is, for arbitrary functions m = ¡(¢).
To describe equilibrium for arbitrary policy we use recursive notation, eliminating time
subscripts and using a prime to denote a variable in the next period. The nine variables
which need to be determined in equilibrium are N, D, p0, ¼, ¢0, w, c, m and n, and the
nine equations are (i and ii) the laws of motion for N (9) and for D (10); (iii) the optimal
pricing condition (11); (iv) the price index (13); (v) the labor market clearing condition
or law of motion for the relative price distortion (20); (vi) the labor supply equation (4);
(vii) money demand (6); (viii) the policy rule m = ¡(¢); and (ix) the de¯nition of the
relative price distortion (19).
15A stationary equilibrium can be expressed as two functions of the endogenous state
variable ¢. The two functions N (¢) and D(¢) must satisfy the two functional equations
N (¢) = ¼
" [w + ®¯N (¢
0)]; (21)
D(¢) = ¼
"¡1 [1 + ®¯D(¢
0)]; (22)

































Given an arbitrary policy of the form m = ¡(¢), functions N () and D() that satisfy
(21)¡(29) represent a stationary equilibrium.
4.2 Discretionary equilibrium de¯ned
A discretionary equilibrium is a particular stationary equilibrium with policy given by
a mapping from the state to the money supply, m = ¡¤ (¢), in which the following
property holds. If the current-period policymaker and current-period private agents take
as given that all future periods will be described by a stationary equilibrium associated
with ¡¤ (¢), then the current-period monetary authority maximizes welfare by choosing
m = ¡¤ (¢) for every ¢.
More formally, a discretionary equilibrium is a policy function ¡¤ (¢) and a value
16function v¤ (¢) that satisfy
v




























¼" [w + ®¯N (¢0)]
¼"¡1 [1 + ®¯D(¢0)]
; (31)
where the functions N () and D() satisfy (21) and (22) in the stationary equilibrium
associated with ¡¤ (¢). Note the subtle di®erence between (31) and (21)¡(23): in (31),
which is the constraint on the current policymaker, we have not imposed a stationary
equilibrium. The policymaker takes as given that the future will be represented by a
stationary equilibrium, but is constrained today only by the private-sector response to
whatever money supply she chooses.
4.3 Computing a discretionary equilibrium
We approximate the value function and the expressions for N () and D() with Chebyshev
polynominals. This computational method involves selecting a degree of approximation
I, and then searching for values of v¤
i and ¡¤
i, for i = 1:::I, that solve (30) at the grid
points for the state variable ¢i de¯ned by the Chebyshev nodes.6 As an initial guess for
v (), N () and D() we use the discretionary equilibrium for the static model { the ¯nal
period of a ¯nite horizon model { and then solve the optimization problem (30). If the
value function and policy function that solve the optimization problem are identical to
the guess, then they form a discretionary equilibrium.7 If not, the starting values are
6In the example of the baseline calibration given in the next section, we use a degree of approximation
I = 10 on the interval [1;1:3] for the state variable.
7Speci¯cally, iteration j is the ¯nal iteration if jjvj ¡ vj¡1jj1 and jj¡j ¡ ¡j¡1jj1 are smaller than
the tolerance level 10¡8. To assess the accuracy of a solution, the di®erence between the left hand side
17updated by pushing out the initial guess one period into the future, and assuming the
one-period-ahead policy and value functions are the ones that solved the optimization
problem.
5 Properties of discretionary equilibrium
There are three levels to a complete description of a discretionary equilibrium. At the
highest level is the equilibrium transition function for the state variable, ¢0 (¢), the
associated policy function, m = ¡¤ (¢), the value function, v¤ (¢), and equilibrium
functions for the other endogenous variables. The next level is the objective function for
the policymaker: for a given value of the state variable, how does welfare vary with the
policy instrument m, and what are the trade-o®s that drive the shape of the objective
function? Finally, for given values of the state variable and the policy instrument, what
is the nature of the private-sector equilibrium? Each of these levels is discussed in turn.
Unless otherwise stated we use the following baseline calibration, interpreting a period
as a quarter: " = 10, ¯ = 0:99, ® = 0:67, ¹ = 0, Â = 4:5. Some of these parameters
are typical values used in the applied monetary policy literature. With ¯ = 0:99 the
annualized real interest rate is 4:1 percent. With " = 10 the steady-state markup is
approximately 11 percent at low rates of in°ation. Prices remain ¯xed with probability
® = 0:67, which means that the expected duration of a price is three quarters. The
calibration of ¹ and " is chosen to facilitate comparison with King and Wolman (2004).
and the right hand side of (30) is calculated using that solution on a grid of 100,000 points that do not
include the Chebyshev nodes. Under the baseline calibration, this residual function has a maximum
absolute approximation error of 2:38¡4.
185.1 Equilibrium as a function of the inherited relative price distortion
Figure 1 plots the transition function for the state variable as well as the function map-
ping from the state to the in°ation rate in a discretionary equilibrium in Panel A. The
¯rst thing to note is that there is a unique steady-state in°ation rate of approximately
8:6 percent annually.8 Two natural benchmarks against which to compare the steady
state of the discretionary equilibrium are the in°ation rate with highest steady-state
welfare and the in°ation rate in the long run under optimal policy with commitment.
Following King and Wolman (1999), we refer to these benchmarks as the golden rule and
the modi¯ed golden rule respectively. For our baseline parameterization, the golden-rule
in°ation rate is just barely positive (less than one tenth of a percent) and the modi¯ed
golden-rule in°ation rate is zero { the latter result is parameter-independent.
In addition to showing the steady state, Panel A illustrates the dynamics of the
state variable, which exhibit monotonic convergence to the steady state. This means
that a policymaker inheriting a relative price distortion that is large (small) relative
to steady state ¯nds it optimal to bequeath a smaller (larger) relative price distortion
to her successor. Together with the monotone downward-sloping equilibrium function
for in°ation, it follows that the in°ation dynamics in the transition from a large (small)
relative price distortion and high (low) in°ation rate involve an initial discrete fall (jump)
in in°ation and a subsequent gradual increase (decrease) to the steady state.9
Panel B of Figure 1 displays the policy variable (m) and welfare (v) as functions
of the state variable in the discretionary equilibrium (m is indicated on the left scale
8Note that in the model ¼ is a gross quarterly in°ation rate, but the ¯gures and the text refer to
annualized net in°ation rates obtained as ¼4 ¡ 1.
9Yun's (2005) analysis of the Calvo model displays similar transition dynamics of in°ation. But in
his model, the steady-state in°ation rate under optimal policy is zero, so the transition from a steady
state with positive in°ation inevitably involves a period of de°ation.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium as a function of the state
20and welfare on the right scale).10 Both functions are downward sloping. Intuition for
the welfare function's downward slope is straightforward. Eq. (19) shows that the
current relative price distortion represents the inverse of average productivity. But the
current relative price distortion is also a summary statistic for the dispersion in relative
prices. The higher is the inherited relative price distortion, the higher is the inherited
dispersion in relative prices, and through (20) this contributes to a higher dispersion
in current relative prices. Higher dispersion in current relative prices in turn reduces
current productivity, reducing welfare.
It is less straightforward to understand the downward sloping policy function, m =
¡¤ (¢). At a super¯cial level, it seems consistent with the state transition function for
m to be decreasing in ¢: if equilibrium involves the relative price distortion declining
from a high level, then a large inherited relative price distortion ought to be met with a
relatively low normalized money supply, so that newly adjusting ¯rms do not exacerbate
the relative price distortion. However, in order to develop the intuition for ¡¤ (¢) more
fully it is necessary to examine the nature of the policy problem in equilibrium.
5.2 Policymaker's objective function
Figure 2 displays the policymaker's objective function (Panel A) and the current period
component of the objective function (Panel B) for two values of the state variable (1
and 1:04). Both panels display functions that are concave, and the unique maximum is
achieved with lower values of m for the higher value of the state. The future component
of value, ¯v (¢0) in (30), is not plotted, but it is decreasing in m for all values of ¢. From
Figure 2 then, the fact that m is a decreasing function of ¢ seems to be associated with
10In Panel B of Figure 1 and in Figure 2 we have not converted welfare into more meaningful
consumption-equivalent units because the magnitudes are very small. The consumption-equivalent wel-
fare measures in these ¯gures would vary by less than 0:02 percent.
21the state variable's in°uence on the current-utility component of welfare. As discussed
in King and Wolman (1999, 2004), real e®ects of monetary policy in models such as this
one work through the relative price distortion (¢0) and the average markup of price over
marginal cost (1=w here). Thus, examining the behavior of these two distortions can
help clarify why the current component of the objective function is maximized with a
lower m the higher is ¢.





















Figure 2: Policymaker's objective function
Figure 3 plots the markup distortion (Panel A) and the relative price distortion (Panel
B) as a function of m for the same two values of the state variable. In both cases higher
22values of m correspond to a lower markup and a higher relative price distortion. This
feature is the essential short-run policy trade-o® in the Calvo (or Taylor) model: a higher
money supply will bring down the markup at the cost of increasing the relative price
distortion. From Figures 2 and 3 it is apparent that as the state variable increases, the
trade-o® shifts in favor of the relative price distortion. That is, the policymaker chooses
lower m at higher values of ¢ because the decrease in the markup that would come from
holding m ¯xed at higher ¢ is more than o®set by welfare costs of a higher relative price
distortion ¢0.




















Figure 3: Distortions as functions of m
23What is the intuition for increased sensitivity of the relative price distortion to m at
higher levels of inherited relative price dispersion (¢)? Although we cannot explicitly
solve for the relationship between the relative price distortion and the money supply, we
can study the relationship between the relative price distortion and the relative price
chosen by adjusting ¯rms. Assuming (correctly) a positive relationship between equilib-
rium p0 and m, this relationship is informative for understanding why the relative price
distortion can be viewed as driving the shape of the policy function.












From this expression it follows that the sensitivity of the relative price distortion to the
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Figure 4 illustrates the relationship between ¢0 and p0 given by (32) for ¢ = 1 and
¢ = 1:04. The current relative price distortion is a locally convex function of the relative
price set by adjusting ¯rms.11 If there is no inherited relative price dispersion (¢ = 1)
then the relative price distortion is minimized at p0 = 1, whereas for higher inherited
dispersion the relative price distortion is minimized at a lower value of p0. As (33) states,
a larger ¢ also corresponds everywhere to a steeper relative price distortion with respect
to p0. Summarizing our argument then: as the state variable increases, the current
policymaker would incur increasing welfare losses due to relative price distortions if she
did not react by choosing m so that price setters set a lower relative price. We have
11The relative price distortion as a function of p0 becomes °at and thus concave at high values of p0;
for high enough p0 customers have negligible demand for the goods sold by adjusters, and additional
price increases have no e®ect on the relative price distortion.
24not plotted the relationship between m and p0, but in a discretionary equilibrium it is
positive and nearly linear. So this reasoning leads to a policy that sets m as a decreasing
function of ¢.











Figure 4: Relative price distortion as function of p0
5.3 Properties of private-sector equilibrium
Our computational approach has led to ¯nding a single discretionary equilibrium. The
preceding discussion highlighted some of the properties of the equilibrium for particular
parameters. Although we have not proved that the equilibrium is unique, in the many
examples studied in this paper we have found no evidence of multiple equilibria.12 This
is in stark contrast to the Taylor model with two-period price setting, in which King
12Starting from the example of the baseline calibration, more than 40 other examples were computed,
with a range of values of ®, " and ¹. Details are available from the authors.
25and Wolman (2004) proved the existence of multiple discretionary equilibria, which they
traced to multiple private-sector equilibria.








Figure 5: Pricing best response function: State = 1 :04, m = 0:20
To help explain why multiplicity of private-sector equilibrium is less prevalent in
the Calvo model, we turn to the best-response function for price-setting ¯rms. The
best-response function describes an individual ¯rm's optimal price as a function of the
price set by other adjusting ¯rms. Figure 5 plots a typical best-response function in
a discretionary equilibrium of the Calvo model, using the baseline calibration. It has a
unique ¯xed point, and is concave in a neighborhood of the ¯xed point.13 In contrast, the
13Our computations have not revealed multiple ¯xed points in equilibrium. However, we have encoun-
tered rare instances of multiple ¯xed points for sub-optimal values of m. In Figure 5 there is a convex
region of the best-response function to the left of the ¯xed point. In the case of multiple ¯xed points,
the convex region of the best-response function intersects the 45-degree line twice, with a third ¯xed
point located on the concave portion.
26best-response function in the two-period Taylor pricing model is upward sloping, strictly
convex and generically has either two ¯xed points or no ¯xed points (see Appendix A
for more details of the Taylor model).
The di®erent shape of the best response function under Calvo pricing is associated
with a di®erent relationship between ¯rms' current optimal price and the future nominal
money supply. This relationship is nonlinear, unlike in the Taylor model, for two reasons.
First, the relationship between the optimal price and the future index of predetermined
prices is nonlinear. Second, the optimal price determines the real future state variable
to which future policy responds. We consider in turn how both these reasons weaken the
complementarity between the price of optimizing ¯rms.
First, suppose that the future policymaker were to set a constant m, raising the
nominal money supply in proportion to the index of predetermined prices. In the Taylor
model, where such a policy is optimal, the price set by adjusting ¯rms is the index of
predetermined prices, so the future nominal money supply rises linearly with the price
set by adjusting ¯rms. Understanding that this future policy response will occur, and
that the price it sets today will also be in e®ect in the future, an individual ¯rm's best
response is to choose a higher price when all other adjusting ¯rms choose a higher price.
In the Calvo model, in contrast, next period's index of predetermined prices comprises
an in¯nite number of lagged prices, of which the price set by adjusting ¯rms today is just
one element. Under a constant m policy, the e®ect of an increase in prices set today on
next period's nominal money supply depends on the e®ect of such an increase on next
period's index of preset prices. That index of preset prices { which is just today's price
index { is highly sensitive to low levels of the price set by ¯rms today, and relatively
insensitive to high levels of the price set by ¯rms today. That is because goods with high
(low) prices have a low (high) expenditure share and thus receive a low (high) weight in
the price index. As the price set by ¯rms goes to in¯nity, it has no e®ect on the index
27of preset prices and no e®ect on tomorrow's nominal money supply.
Thus, in the Calvo model a constant m policy would lead to a nominal money supply
that is increasing and concave in the price set by adjusting ¯rms. Because a higher future
money supply leads ¯rms to set a higher price today, concavity of the future money
supply corresponds to decreasing complementarity between the prices set by adjusters.
This intuition is con¯rmed by the following result for the in¯nite labor supply elasticity
case, which is the baseline calibration.
Proposition 1 Suppose the money supply is always set according to a constant m policy,
regardless of the state, and let ¹ = 0. Then the Calvo model has a unique private-sector
equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The second reason for weaker complementarity in the Calvo model is that the rela-
tionship between the current optimal price and the future nominal money supply depends
on the future state variable. Indeed, the policy maker does not hold m constant, instead
lowering it with the state (see Figure 1.B). The response of next period's normalized
money supply to the price set by adjusting ¯rms today therefore depends on the rela-
tionship between p0 and ¢0. Equation (32) implies that for high (low) values of p0 the
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Given that equilibrium m is decreasing in ¢, future m is decreasing in p0 for high values
of p0 and increasing in p0 for low values of p0. That is, a higher price set by adjusting
¯rms{ if it is greater than 1=¢ { translates into a higher value of the future state, and
thus a lower value of the future normalized money supply. At low values of p0 this
relationship is reversed: increases in p0 reduce the future state, and the policymaker
would respond by raising future m.
28Summarizing the argument: in the Taylor model the normalized money supply is
constant in equilibrium, and this results in an increasing convex best-response function
with multiple ¯xed points. In the Calvo model, if policy kept the normalized money
supply constant there would be a unique equilibrium: complementarity would be weaker
at high p0 than in the Taylor model, because next period's index of predetermined prices
responds only weakly to p0 at high levels of p0. Because the normalized money supply
is not constant in the Calvo model, the complementarity is weakened even further; m is
decreasing in the state, and future m is decreasing in p0 for high p0.
Both parts of this argument rely on the fact that there are many cohorts of ¯rms
with predetermined prices in the Calvo model. In the ¯rst part, the e®ect of prices set
by adjusting ¯rms on tomorrow's index of predetermined prices depends on the level of
those prices set today, because consumers can shift their expenditures to the cohorts that
set prices in previous periods. In the second part, the presence of many predetermined
prices gives rise to the state variable, through which the future policymaker is dissuaded
from accommodating large increases in the current price level. Thus, the existence of
many cohorts of prices seems to be key to explaining why the Calvo model does not
have the same tendency toward multiple discretionary equilibria as the Taylor model
with two-period pricing. This reasoning suggests however that a Taylor model with
longer duration pricing might not have multiplicity, because the same opportunities to
substitute would be present. Unfortunately, it is computationally infeasible to study
discretionary equilibrium in a Taylor model with long-duration pricing, unless one uses
linear approximation methods as in Dotsey and Hornstein (2003).
Although our computations have found only one equilibrium in every case, it is impor-
tant to note that we have not proved uniqueness of equilibrium. However, Proposition
1 gives us some con¯dence that the numerical results do generalize: the constant m
policy, which is key to proving that there are multiple private sector equilibria in the
29Taylor model, implies a unique private sector equilibrium in the Calvo model. If, as we
suppose, Markov Perfect equilibrium is unique, the nature of equilibrium ought to be
invariant to (i) the policy instrument and (ii) whether we solve a planner's problem, in
which the planner picks allocations directly as in Anderson, Kim and Yun (2010). For
our baseline parameterization we have con¯rmed that the same steady-state in°ation
rate obtains whether the policy instrument is the money supply or the nominal interest
rate. In addition, we have replicated the steady-state in°ation rate of 2:2 percent for
the baseline case with ® = 0:75, " = 11, and ¹ = 1 reported in Anderson, Kim and Yun
(2010), for both interest rate and money supply instruments.
6 In°ation sensitivity to structural parameters
Steady-state in°ation under the baseline calibration exceeds eight percent, as mentioned
before. Since there is not widespread agreement about the proper values for the price
non-adjustment probability ®, the desired markup "=("¡1), or the labor supply elasticity
1=¹, Figure 6 displays the steady-state in°ation rate as a function of ® (Panel A), "=("¡1)
(Panel B) and 1=¹ (Panel C).
As the ¯gure shows, the steady-state in°ation rate in a discretionary equilibrium
varies between essentially zero for extremely high price stickiness with a desired markup
of 1:11, to greater than 40 percent with a price non-adjustment probability of 0:67, a
desired markup of 1:33 and an in¯nite labor supply elasticity. These results show that
the Calvo model does not provide a clear-cut answer to the question, how big is the
in°ation bias?
The steady-state in°ation rate is increasing in the price non-adjustment probability
for low ® and decreasing for high ®, with a maximum in°ation rate of 10:1 percent
reached when ® = 0:71. The steady-state in°ation rate is monotonically increasing in
the desired markup and the labor supply elasticity.





A. Steady−state inflation and price rigidity
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B. Steady−state inflation and monopoly power
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C. Steady−state inflation and labor supply elasticity
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%
Figure 6: Steady-state in°ation rate
31In interpreting these ¯gures, the policymaker's trade-o® between the relative price
distortion and the markup is central. In a steady-state equilibrium, the policymaker is
optimizing. Thus, the marginal bene¯t from decreasing the markup through a higher
in°ation rate is o®set by the marginal cost associated with a larger relative price distor-
tion. At higher degrees of price stickiness, the policymaker has greater leverage over the
markup. Thus, as we move to the right in Panel A, the marginal bene¯t of higher current
in°ation at a given steady-state in°ation rate is increasing. In order to counteract this
larger marginal bene¯t, there must be a larger marginal cost through the relative price
distortion. At low levels of price stickiness this larger marginal relative-price-distortion
cost requires a higher in°ation rate. But as we move to very high levels of price sticki-
ness, the higher price stickiness itself accomplishes the required increase in the marginal
cost of in°ation. Thus, equilibrium occurs at lower in°ation rates.
Panels B and C of Figure 6 display a monotonically increasing relationship between
in°ation and the desired markup and between in°ation and the labor supply elasticity.
The same reasoning applies to these relationships. As the desired markup or the labor
supply elasticity increases, the monetary authority has more leverage over the markup,
so the marginal bene¯t of higher in°ation that arises from its ability to reduce the
markup is increasing. In order to balance this larger marginal bene¯t, there must be a
larger marginal relative-price-distortion cost of in°ation. That in turn requires a higher
steady-state in°ation rate.
7 Concluding remarks
The Calvo model linearized around a zero-in°ation steady state yields the New Keynesian
Phillips curve, which has become the leading framework for applied monetary policy anal-
ysis. While there have been numerous analyses of discretionary monetary policy using the
New Keynesian Phillips curve, little attention has been devoted to understanding discre-
32tionary equilibrium in the underlying (non-linear) Calvo model. This paper has aimed to
further such understanding. Discretionary equilibrium involves a positive steady-state in-
°ation rate, and the steady-state in°ation rate varies non-monotonically with the degree
of price stickiness; together these results suggest that the zero-in°ation approximation
is inappropriate in the absence of a ¯scal scheme to eliminate the monopoly distortion.
We also compared discretionary equilibrium in the Calvo model to the Taylor model
with two-period pricing. The complementarity inherent in the Taylor model (King and
Wolman, 2004) is substantially weakened in the Calvo model, typically leading to a
unique private-sector equilibrium. The choice between super¯cially similar models (Calvo
and Taylor) can thus have important implications for policy analysis, here for the nature
of equilibrium when the policymaker cannot commit to future plans.
Our ¯nding of large variation in the steady-state in°ation rate across parameter values
raises the question of whether exogenous price adjustment is a reasonable assumption.
One could argue that the Calvo model should only be studied local to a steady state {
only there is it reasonable to assume ¯xed price adjustment probabilities { and thus that
LQ approaches to discretionary equilibrium are appropriate. Another view, which we
favor, is that the very nature of the discretionary policymaker's problem merits a global
analysis. If the results cast doubt on the Calvo pricing assumption, the proper response
is not to change the analysis from global to LQ, but to use a di®erent model such as one
where ¯rms' likelihood of price adjustment is allowed to vary with economic conditions.
It seems inevitable that expanding our analysis to an environment with state-dependent
pricing would add state variables to the problem, but it is surely a worthwhile topic for
future research.14
14Siu (2008) studies discretionary policy in a model with some state-dependence, limiting the state
space by allowing ¯rms to adjust costlessly after two periods.
33Appendix A: Background results from the Taylor model
In the Taylor model each ¯rm sets its price for two periods. The description of the
representative household remains unchanged, but the value of a ¯rm upon adjustment is
given by
~ Vt = max
Xt
fd(Xt;Pt;ct;wt) + Qt;t+1d(Xt;Pt+1;ct+1;wt+1)g;









wt + ¯ (Pt+1=Pt)
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1 + ¯ (Pt+1=Pt)
"¡1 :
Whereas in the Calvo model the index of predetermined prices was given by Pt¡1, in
the Taylor model there is just one predetermined price, P0;t¡1. Normalizing the optimal
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"¡1 : (35)
As in the Calvo model, this condition indicates that the ¯rm chooses a constant markup
over a weighted average of current and future marginal costs.
Labor supply is given by equation (4). Money demand (5) is normalized by the lagged






















































There is one predetermined nominal price (P0;t¡1), but there are no state variables in
the labor market clearing condition.
In the Taylor model, the ¯ve equations (4) and (35)¡(38), together with the behavior
of future policymakers, implicitly de¯ne the set of feasible values for wt, ct, nt, pt and
~ p0;t attainable by the current-period monetary authority. The current-period monetary
authority chooses the money supply, or equivalently ~ mt, the money supply normalized
by the predetermined price. Unlike the Calvo model, no state variables constrain the
monetary authority in an MPE. The lagged optimal price P0;t¡1 matters for the levels of
nominal variables, but is irrelevant for the determination of real allocations.
King and Wolman (2004) use a price-setting ¯rm's best-response function to study
discretionary equilibria in the Taylor model. That function is the optimal pricing condi-
tion (35) rewritten so that the right hand side is in terms of current and future ~ m and
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0)=p(~ p0)]
"¡1:
For any value of ~ m, King and Wolman show that for ¯xed ~ m0 and ~ p0
0 the best-response
function is monotonically increasing and strictly convex with two ¯xed points or no ¯xed
points (there is a knife-edge case with a unique ¯xed point). The presence of two ¯xed
points for arbitrary ~ m means that there are multiple discretionary equilibria, indexed
by the distribution over the two ¯xed points of the best-response function (these ¯xed
35points vary with the distribution). In a discretionary equilibrium there are endogenous
°uctuations over the two ¯xed points.
King and Wolman stress that the complementarity necessary for multiple ¯xed points
is associated with the fact that under discretion, the policymaker in the next period is
certain to raise the nominal money supply proportionally with the price set by ¯rms in
the current period. An individual ¯rm in the current period responds positively to the
price set by other ¯rms in order to avoid being stuck next period with high demand and
a nominal price that is low relative to nominal costs. In the Taylor model, this e®ect is
relatively weak at low values of p0 and relatively strong at high values of p0. Another
way to view the complementarity is between future policy and expected future policy:
if ¯rms expect a higher nominal money supply in the future, they will set a higher price
today, and the future policymaker will accommodate with a higher money supply.
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 1
This appendix presents the proof of Proposition 1. Recall from equation (13) that








which has the following properties:
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The outcomes p0;T, NT, and DT do not depend on the state because monetary policy does
not depend on the state. Moreover, there can be no complementarity in price setting
in period T, because the pricing best-response function (43) of any given ¯rm does not
depend on other ¯rms' price decisions.
Note from (41) that NT = NT(mT;p0;T) and from (42) that DT = DT(p0;T). We can
now analyze the period T ¡1 pricing best-response function to determine whether there
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The optimal price does not depend on the state because the monetary policy function
and the functions NT and DT do not depend on the state. To see that the best response
function has a unique ¯xed point, ¯rst write it as
^ p0;T¡1 = AT¡1(p0;T)mT¡1 + BT¡1(mT;p0;T)¼(p0;T¡1);











37Because the best response function is always positive and concave it has a unique ¯xed
point. Therefore, there exists a unique private-sector equilibrium in period T ¡ 1.
Write NT¡1 = NT¡1(mT¡1;mT;p0;T¡1;p0;T) and DT¡1 = DT¡1(p0;T¡1;p0;T). In period







"¡1 [ÂmT¡2 + ®¯NT¡1(mT¡1;mT;p0;T¡1;p0;T)¼(p0;T¡2)]
DT¡2 = ¼(p0;T¡2)
"¡1 [1 + ®¯DT¡1(p0;T¡1;p0;T)]:
Hence the period T ¡ 2 best response function can be written as
^ p0;T¡2 = AT¡2(p0;T¡1;p0;T)mT¡2 + BT¡2(mT¡1;mT;p0;T¡1;p0;T)¼(p0;T¡2);
where AT¡2 > 0 and BT¡2 > 0 because mT¡1;mT > 0. By the same arguments as above
there is a unique ¯xed point in period T ¡ 2.







"¡1 [Âmt + ®¯N(mt+1;mt+2;:::;p0;t+1;p0;t+2;:::)¼(p0;t)]
Dt = ¼(p0;t)
"¡1 [1 + ®¯D(p0;t+1;p0;t+2;:::)]:
The period t best-response function therefore can be written as
^ p0;t = At(p0;t+1;p0;t+2;:::)mt + Bt(mt+1;mt+2;:::;p0;t+1;p0;t+2;:::)¼(p0;t);
where At > 0 and Bt > 0 because mt+1;mt+2;::: > 0.
Therefore, by backward induction, there is a unique private-sector equilibrium asso-
ciated with the arbitrary constant m policy.
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